
Nugget (pending title)
Modern institutions model agency on a hidden theology: first achieve godlike knowledge, then exert godlike control. When that model fails, people conclude nothing can be done — because they defined power as something only God could wield. A relational, improvisational alternative already exists and has a better historical track record.
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The Source

What do you do when you realise modernity is ending? Dougald Hine with Jonathan Rowson
The Observer
The Translation
AI-assisted summaryFamiliar terms
A theological architecture lies concealed within the dominant modern conception of agency. Large-scale actors — states, international bodies, major institutions — have operated according to a two-step model that recapitulates divine attributes: first omniscience (total surveillance, comprehensive mapping, synoptic knowledge), then omnipotence (decisive intervention to produce predetermined outcomes). James C. Scott's analysis in Seeing Like a State documents the catastrophic consequences of this high-modernist logic. But the deeper problem is structural: when this model of agency collapses, it does not automatically yield a better one. If the implicit theology has not been named and questioned, the failure of godlike agency produces not humility but despair — the conclusion that nothing can be done, because agency itself has been defined in terms only a deity could satisfy.
The alternative is not a scaled-down version of the same model but a genuinely different paradigm: agency as the creation of conditions of possibility. This understanding surfaces across disparate traditions — somatic practices like tai chi, theatrical improvisation, relational anthropology — all of which treat action as responsive, situated, and generative rather than predictive and controlling.
Karl Polanyi's account of the double movement in The Great Transformation provides historical grounding. The counter-movement that eventually produced welfare states, labor protections, and social insurance was not a coherent political program placed alongside laissez-faire on the same ideological plane. It was improvised from below by actors who shared no common ideology, responding to the lived destruction wrought by the top-down project. The counter-movement did not need to win the argument first; it needed to exist. This reframes strategic thinking: not planning the alternative in advance, but cultivating the relational and institutional soil from which alternatives can emerge.